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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

REDMAN WAREHOUSING CORPORATION,
a Texas corpora ti on,

Plaintiff-Appellants

Docket No. 15159

v.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
CLEARFIELD CITY CORPORATION,
ROBERT O 'BLOCK and GORDON OLCH,
d/b/a FREEPORT CENTER ASSOCIATES,
and WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION I
Defendants-Respondents

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Redman Warehousing Corporation
against the several defendants seeking reimbursement for expenses
Redman claims it incurred in protecting property stored in Redman' s
Warehouse.

Redman claims the property was damaged by floods at

the Freeport Center on July 13 and 19, 1973.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Second District Court for Davis County, Honorable
John F. Wahlquist, granted summary judgment against plaintiffappellant and in favor of defendant-respondent, Robert O'Block
and Gordon Olch d/b/a Freeport Center Associates which is the
subject of this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellant is a Texas corporation
the warehousing business in Utah.

(R. 1.)

engaged.

It stored proper:

for defendant Whirlpool Corporation (R. 4, 20.) which Plaint;'
claims sustained water damage as a result of floods

and 19, 1973.

on July l:

On December 6, 1973, plaintiff filed

(R. 18, reverse side.)

a cornplai::
to recover damages from Whirlpool Cow·
,

tion, Clearfield and Freeport Center.

..

Plaintiff issued summo:;

to defendants Whirlpool and Clearfield City and caused them tc
served during 1974.

(R.

20 reverse side, 323, 324.)

Theproc'

of litigation thereafter ensued between plaintiff, Clearfield,
Whirlpool.
The statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff';
claim expired on July 19, 1976.

On September 27, D76, after:

expiration of the statutory period, and well beyond the three·
month period after the filing of the complaint in which a
must be issued (R.
Center.
29, 1976.

204~),

SUJlllt

plaintiff issued a summons to Freeport

The summons was served upon Freeport Center on SeptemL
(R. 205.)

On October 26, 1976 (R. 2D6.), Freeport Center answere:
plaintiff's complaint and specifically pleaded that the appli·
cable statute of limitations barred plaintiff's claim.

Freepor:

· ·
·
defense on the plaintif'
Center based its statute of limitations
failure to issue a summons within three months following the fi
ing of a complaint.

Freeport Center then move d f o r summary

nsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Serv
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judgment and filed a supporting memorandwn which argued that
plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations because the plaintiff had failed to issue a swnmons to Freeport
center within three months and that the plaintiff could not refile its complaint because the three-year statutory period had
expired.

(R. 303-308.)

Plaintiff submitted an opposing memo-

randum and argued that Utah law did not require it to issue a
surrunons to Freeport Center within three months after filing its
complaint, and that despite its failure to issue a swnmons within three months, Freeport Center was nevertheless answerable
under the complaint filed before the statute of limitations had
run.

(R. 319-325.)

The parties orally elaborated on these

argwnents before the trial court, after which the court granted
Freeport Center's motion for swnmary judgment and ordered that
plaintiff's complaint against it be dismissed.
Plaintiff appealed to this Court.

(R.

(R. 346 et. seq.)

338.)

INTRODUCTION
The trial court properly granted swnmary judgment in
favor of defendant Freeport Center for the following three reasons:
(l)

The action was barred by the statute of limi-

tations, Utah Code Ann.
(2)

§

78-12-26(2) (1953);

The swnmons was not issued within the three-month

period provided by Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction over

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-3Machine-generated
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4

defendant Freeport Center; and
(3)

The action was barred by laches.

In its brief, plaintiff urges this Court to reverse

I

judgment on these grounds:
(1)

That the statute of limitations does not bar, I

action because once a complaint is filed within the sta:.:
period, it perpetually endures, and a summons may issue:
on at any time, no matter how much time has passed since:
filing of the complaint;
That in multiple-defendant ca<e', UtehRo1'

,,1

Civil Procedure 4 (b) 's requirement that summons issue

·1r~

(2)

three months requires only that a summons be issued too:
defendant within that time; and
(3)

That Freeport Center failed properly .to plead\

the defense of insufficiency of process and waived its r.
to rely on it as a basis for summary judgment.
Significantly, plaintiff's brief does not argue that the tria:
court erred in ruling the a~tion barred by laches.
In this brief, Freeport Center demonstrates that

pt.\

tiff's arguments are unsupported by authority and that the tr::I
court's judgment was correct and should be affirmed.
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POINT I
THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The parties agree that Utah Code Ann.

§

78-12-26(2)

(1953), which requires that actions for taking, detaining or
injuring personal property be commenced within three years, is
the statute of limitations applicable to this case.
~)

(R. 346 et.

They also agree that no summons directed to Freeport Center

was issued within three months after the filing of the complaint,
nor was any summons issued to or served upon Freeport Center
until after the expiration of the three-year period following
the accrual of plaintiff's cause of action.
Brief for Appellant at 2.)

(R. 204, 205;

These facts being undisputed, the

trial court properly dismissed the action because, inter alia,
the statute of limitations barred it.
Plaintiff, however, renews before this Court its argument, unsuccessful below, that the mere filing of the complaint
within the statutory period is all that is necessary to comply with
the statute of limitations, no matter when a summons is issued
or served.

Were plaintiff correct, a potential plaintiff could

comply with the statute of limitations merely by filing a complaint with the court but issue no summons to give the defendant
notice of the action.

Decades later, he could issue and serve a

summons on the defendant and enforce his stale claim.
of course, does not permit this.

Utah law,

Plaintiff must do more than

file his complaint to satisfy the statute.

He must also issue

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a sununons to the defendant within three mont h s and serve it
within one year.

Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b).

so his action will be "deemed dismissed."

I f pl·

·
ain t1f f fails :

Id.

The statute's purpose, to prevent stale claims anc
prevent the unfairness inherent in requiring a defendant to
defend against an ancient claim is fulfilled.

The defendant

!

receive notice through service of process no later than one ys,·
following the end of the period prescribed by the statute of
lirni tations, and even earlier--wi thin three months-- if the pr:cess server does not delay.

"Developments in the Law--Statutl

of Limitations," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1185 (1950).
Despite the inconsistency of its argument with the

1

1

clear purposes of the statute of limitations, plaintiff argues
that a timely filed complaint

perpetually endures and that a I

sununons may at any time issue thereon and be served.

Plainti:'I

cites Askwith v. Ellis, 85 Utah 103, 38 P.2d 757 (1934), as
port for this position.

I

sJ

As the trial court recognized, plain:.

is in error and Askwith, a 1934 case, has been overruled by t.\s
adoption of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b).

. h

~

In~,~.

I

Court held that although Utah R.S. § 104-5-5 (1933), the stat'·
tory predecessor of Rule 4 (b) , required that a summons be issus:
within three months, failure to do so was not fatal because tie
·
1 of an action if
statute made no provision for the dismissa
plaintiff breached the three -month issuance or one-year service
requirements.

The opinion states:

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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There is no provision ~n the statute by which an action
ceases to exist; by which an action terminates, ends, is
dismissed . . · because no summons has been issued or
served. It may well be that such a rule would be advisable, salutory and just, but it is the duty of the Legislature and not of the courts to make such the law.
Askwith v. Ellis, supra, at 38 P. 2d 759 [emphasis supplied].
The drafters of the present Rule 4(b) adopted this
court's suggestion in Askwith by providing that an action would
be "deemed dismissed" for violating its requirement that summons
be timely issued and served:
If an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint,
summons must issue thereon within three months from the
date of such filing. Summons must be served within one
year after the filing of the complaint, or the action
will be deemed dismissed.
UtahR. Civ. P. 4(b).
Since Rule 4(b) was adopted, this Court has twice had

occasion to consider the effect of a plaintiff's failure to
issue or serve a summons within the proper time limits.

In

Sorenson v. Sorenson, 18 Utah 2d 101, 417 P.2d 118 (1966), the
defendant had been served beyond the one year Rule 4(b) allows
but defendant waited until appeal to contend that the district
court had no j ursidiction over her.

This Court stated:

She would be correct under the rule except she counterclaimed, sought relief, got part of that for which she
asked, and now complains that with all this she should
receive the benefits of the lower court's decision but
not the bitter fruits thereof.
~·

at 417 P. 2d 119 [emphasis supplied].
Later, in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. Dietrich,

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for-7digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
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25 Utah 2d 65, 475 P.2d 1005 (1970), this Court f

in which service was proper, but the summo

aced a sit:,

1·

ns served had not:

issued within three months as Rule 4(b) requires.

FollowiJ:

I
!

service of the untimely issued summons on the defendant, tf.E ;
plaintiff served a writ of garnishment on his employer in er:
to intercept his wages.

1

This Court ruled that the lower co,~·

had no jurisdiction over the defendant, even though the gar~:
rather than the defendant appeared to contest the court's j·~.
diction over him.*

Thus Fibreboard makes clear that the dis:_·

sal language in Rule 4 (b) applies to untimely issuance as we:.\
untimely service since the service in Fibreboard was timely.

I

In the present case, the defendant its elf, Freeport
Center, appeared to contest the untimely issued summons. The
trial court ruled, consistent with Sorenson and
since plaintiff failed to issue a summons to

I

Fibreboard,~:

Fre~port

Center I

within three months, the court had no jurisdiction and there·
fore dismissed the action.

I

*This Court's decision in Fibreboard, supra, is in
accord with decisions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procec~
The Federal Rules differ from Utah's in that ~he. fe~eral co~.: 1.
clerk, a public official, rather than the plaintiff s attor 1 1
issues the summons and must issue it within a rea~onable tlll!e;.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (a).
Even though a public official ha7 ;~e.:; 1
to issue the summons, federal courts have dismissed act 10 .be;··:1
although the complaint was filed within the peri'?d pres~~\erJ
the statute of limitations, the summon~ ~as not issu~dclovis, I
within a reasonable time. Murphy v. Citizens Bank o
. troa"
244 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1957) (13 months); Fistel v. Chn§__...::'l
13 F.R.D. 245 (W.D. Pa. 1952) (10-1/2 months)·
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-8Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Had plaintiff not waited until the statute of limitations expired, the complaint could have been refiled and a new
sUJ11Il\ons properly issued and served.

But its delay prevented it

from reinstating the action, and the trial court therefore properly held plaintiff's claim barred by the statute of limitations.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF VIOLATED RULE 4(b) BY FAILING
TO ISSUE A SUMMONS TO EACH DEFENDANT
WITHIN THREE MONTHS AFTER FILING ITS
COMPLAINT.
Plaintiff argues in its brief is that Rule 4(b) requires a summons to issue to only one defendant within three
months in a multiple -defendant action.

Plaintiff contends that

by issuing a summons to one of the defendants within three months,

its delay of almost two years in issuing a summons to Freeport
Center did not violate the Rule.
Plaintiff is attempting to twist the plain meaning of
Rule 4(b).

That rule provides:

If an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint,
summons must issue thereon within three months from the
date of such filing. The summons must be served within
one year after the filing of the complaint or the action
will be deemed dismissed, provided that in any action
brought against two or more defendants in which personal
service has been obtained upon one of them within the
year, the other or others may be served or appear at
any time before trial.
The Rule contains two general statements--that summons
must issue within three months and that it must be served within
a year.

The proviso which follows, allowing all but one defen-

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology-9Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

II

multiple-defendant case to be served any t'
l
-ll11ebe•·1
trial unmistakably reveals that without the proviso th
'··
,
e ge~,.
statement requiring service within a year would apply
·1
to al!
defendants.
Since the Rule omits a proviso for issuance of
dant in a

1

process in multiple defendant actions, one can only conclude I
that the general statement requiring issuance within three mo:j
applies to all defendants.
In addition, plaintiff fails to appreciate the pur;c, I
underlying the proviso allowing delayed service in multiple·
defendant cases.

The proviso contemplates that defendants ma;

difficult to find, and allows the court to assert jurisdictio:I
over all defendants provided the plaintiff does all that it ca:.

I

to enable the court to obtain jurisdiction:

files a complaint.I

issues a summons to each defendant, and obtains service on at
least one defendant.
tiff's control.

Issuance lies completely within the

I

pla~-1

All he need do is "place [a summons] in the I

hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service." ~
Civ. p. 4 (a) .

A proviso relieving the plaintiff of the simple I

task, completely within his control, of placing a summons in

::•j

hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service woulG

::::s:u::sl::i:::i:~:::::u:~ was accordingly

I

omitt•d "'

-10-·
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POINT III
PLAINTIFF MAY NOT RAISE FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL FREEPORT CENTER'S
ALLEGED FAILURE TO PRESERVE ITS DEFENSE
OF INSUFFICIENCY OF PROCESS.
Plaintiff for the first time contends that Freeport
center failed to raise the issue of insufficiency of process in
its answer or by a motion pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (4) and has
therefore waived it.

On the contrary, Freeport Center did chal-

lenge the sufficiency of process in its answer by specifically
pleading the statue of limitations when the only basis for the
statute of limitations defense was the insufficiency of an untimely
issued summons.

(R. 206.)

Freeport Center

su~cessfully

argued

that the untimely issued summons did not give the court jurisdiction over it, and that the statute of limitations had expired,
preventing plaintiff from refiling the complaint.
admits as much in its brief to this Court:

Plaintiff

"The basis of defen-

dant's Statute of Limitations defense is the purported insufficiency of the process served on them on September 29, 1976."
Brief for Appellant at 8.
Moreover, whether Freeport Center should technically
have plead the defense of insufficiency of process rather than
statute of limitations is now irrelevant before this Court.
Plaintiff made no objection before the trial court and, indeed,
argued the merits of the defense orally and in its memorandum.
(R.

319-322, 346 et. seq.) As this Court has held many times, it
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is a fundamental tenet

of our judicial system that an .

·

lSSt; '

not be raised for the first time on appeal.

Thompson

D~I

v. Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (1973); state~\
Through Road Comm'n v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295

,

495

p. 2d

811::1
1

Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971); ~
General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970); Ir.
Ekker's Estate, 19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967); Riterv~
19 Utah 2d 358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967); Hamilton v. Salt Lake Cc:•
Sewerage Improvement District No. l, 15 Utah 2d 216, 390

P.J

I

( 19 6 4) ; Dolores Uranium Corp. v. Jones, 14 Utah 2d 280, 382 p I
883

I

(1963); Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Utah 2d 397, 375! ..

I
I

456

(1962); Carson v. Douglas, 12 Utah 2d 424, 367 P.2d 462

(1962); Huber v. Deep Creek Irr. Co., 6 Utah 2d 15, 305

I

P.2a:-1

(1956); Flemetis v. McArthur, 119 Utah 268, 226 P.2d 124 lB11

1

North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irr. Co., ll8 Utah 600,:\
P.2d 577 (1950); Neilson v. Eisen, 116 Utah 343, 209 P.2d 921
(1949); Drummond

v. Union Pac. R. Co., 111 Utah 289, 177 P.1c

I

1

903

(1947).
Another rationale compels the same conclusion.

15 (b)

1

Rule I

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted to prei;:\

·
·
d e f e cts as a basi' s for exclut\
a party f ram re l ying
on p l ea d ing
issues actually tried by the court:
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by
11
express or implied consent of the parties, they s~a d
be treated in all respects as if they had been. ra~s: 5
in the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleading .
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evi-
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dence and to raise th~se issues may be made upon motion
of any party at any tllTle, even after judgment, but
failure so to amend does not affect the result or-the
trial of these issues.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15 (b)

(emphasis supplied].

This Court, consis-

tent with the position taken by the federal courts, has construed
Rule 15(b) to prevent a party from assigning as error on appeal
the failure of the pleadings to raise issues which were subsequently tried by express or implied consent before the lower
court.

This Court has quoted from Moore's Federal Practice:

At the trial Rule 15 enables the case to be litiaged
on the merits. It does this in two ways:
(a) in effect
pleadings are automatically amended to conform to proof
on issues tried by express or implied consent. • . •
The sporting element in litigation is ~liminated • • • •
This is true because Rule 15(b) provides:
'Such amendment
of the pleading as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment,
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues.'
Moore's Federal Practice,
!:E_

§

15.02 at 805 (2d ed. 1948), quoted

Draper v. J.B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah 567, 244 P.2d

360 (1952).

Later, in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d
86 (1963), this Court held that where an affirmative defense was

not properly plead but the merit of the affirmative defense was
tried before the lower court, Rule lS(b) required that it be
presumed that the defense had been properly plead.

This Court

noted that the rule allowed the pleadings to be amended to conform to the proof actually received in the trial, and further
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4
provided, "failure so to amend d
trial of these issues."

oes no

Id .; Ut a h R .
__

t

a

ff

c 1.V.
·

ect the result c: ·'
p•

15(b).

Plaintiff, having argued the merits of Freeport Ce:~
defense of insufficiency of process without objection before '
lower court, cannot now for the first time raise the issuec,,
this Court.
POINT IV

I

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY LACHES.

The trial court also granted Freeport Center's mot:I
for summary judgment because of laches.

(R. 327-328, 346

J

Plaintiff-appellant, in its brief, totally ignored this gro[:f
granting the motion.

As this Court has stated:

The rule is well-settled that a judgment is endowed
with a preswnption of validity; that the party attack· !
ing i t has the burden of affirmatively showing that it
is in error; and that the evidence and all inferences
that fairly and reasonably may be drawn therefrom must
be viewed in the light most favorable to it.
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 89 (1963);~ 1
also Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 470

i.:.I

399 (1970); Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d lli ·
(1961).

Having ignored the ground of laches, plaintiff hasc

met his burden to prove the judgment in error, and it theref::
must stand.
Moreover, this Court has long recognized the defen:'
laches.

Papanikolas Bros. Ent. v. Sugarhouse

Shopping~
11

535 P. 2d 1256 (Utah, 1975); Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120 Utah :
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232 P.2d 769 (1951); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P. 2d
S28 (1943); Jones Min. Co. v. Cardiff Min. & Mill. co., 56 Utah

449, 191 P.426

(1920).

In Papanikolas, this Court recited the elements of the
defense:
(l)

The lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff;

(2)

An injury to defendant owing to such lack of
diligence.

Papanikolas, supra, at 535 P.2d 1260.

The record contains ample

evidence to support the trial court's determination that plaintiff
was guilty of laches.

The numerous letters which passed between

the parties reveal that plaintiff was aware from the very beginning
of the pertinent facts which it claims make Freeport Center liable
to it.

(R. 230-252.)

Just over one year after the flood, plaintiff

filed its complaint, naming Freeport Center as a defendant.

But

it waited for two years, for no reason apparent from the record,
until after the statute of limitations had run, before issuing a
swrunons to or serving Freeport Center.
In addition to unreasonable delay on plaintiff's part,
the record shows prejudice to Freeport Center resulting from the
delay.

Because of the late date on which Freeport was finally

served Freeport may be barred by the applicable statutes of
limitations from asserting its cross-claim against Clearfield for
indemnity in the event that Freeport should be found liable.

(R.
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209.)

Defendant Whirlpool's third-party complaint for

nity against Clearfield was dismissed for this

inde:.,
·
very reason I

330-331.); Freeport Center's cross-claim could suffer
fate.

'
the s~ I
'

In view of plaintiff's abdication of its burden:c
show error on the part of the trial court and the evidence::.
the record sufficient to support the decision, the trial ccc::.
judgment that plaintiff's claim is barred by laches must be :
sustained.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of showina
the trial court's judgment erroneous.
First, plaintiff failed to issue a summons to Freed
Center within the time required by the Utah Rules of· Civil Pr:·
cedure, and has not shown that the trial court erred in disi:'
ing the action on that ground.

I
I

second, plaintiff's argument that once a complaint· 1
filed a sununons may be issued thereon and served at any time:

I

even in violation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and i::'I
''
the statute of limitations has expired, rests on overruled a-r.\

i

ority and unsound principle.

Third, plaintiff's brief does not even contend tha: I
the court erred in dismissing the action on the

ground of lac';I

Finally, plaintiff's procedural point that Freepor:
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center did not timely raise its defense of insufficiency of process is factually incorrect and, in any event, has been waived by
plaintiff's failure to raise the matter before the trial court.
IT IS THEREFORE RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED that the Second
District Court for Davis County committed no error, and that its
judgment against plaintiff Redman Warehousing Corporation in favor
of Robert O'Block and Gordon Olch d/b/a Freeport Center Associates
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

800 continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent
Robert O'Block and Gordon Olch
d/b/a Freeport Center Associates
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The under signed hereby certifies that he delivere"
a copy of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to Mr. Robert w.
Miller of Nelson, Harding, Richards, Leonard

&

Tate, 48 Post

Office Place, Salt Lake City, Utah, Attorneys for Appellant,
,,;,

this

j

day of August, 1977.
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